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In this paper I analyse grade in￿ ation when students di⁄er both in ability
and social background. I consider a signalling game where a school may
in￿ ate the grade of low-ability students and a company decides whether
ot hiring or not the students, and observes their grades. In the one-shot
(repeated) version of the game, the company is aware (unaware) of the school
strategy and the distribution of ability. The results suggest that a school can
in￿ ate grades in order to smooth down class di⁄erences in the job market.
The results in the repeated game can explain how string-pulling can emerge
as a job hiring strategy in the presence of grade in￿ ation and school low
reputation.
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Grade in￿ ation, i.e., the awarding of higher grades than students deserve,
makes it more di¢ cult to identify the truly excellent students, as more stu-
dents come to obtain the highest possible grade. In many educational sys-
tems grade in￿ ation has risen over the years and now it is strong in many
countries.1
In this paper we analyse grade in￿ ation by assuming that students di⁄er
both in ability and social background. The idea is to examine whether grade
in￿ ation may in fact have some positive e⁄ect in soothing class di⁄erences. I
assume that students with advantaged social backgrounds are more likely to
have high ability. Given the same distribution of innate ability within pop-
ulation with di⁄ering social backgrounds, an advantaged environment can
help developing non-cognitive skills via parental and peer pressure so that,
on average, the overall ability results higher for students with an advantaged
background. The assumption is in line with past research documenting that
family and environmental factors are major predictors of the individuals￿abil-
ity (Cunha et al., 2006, Carneiro and Heckman, 2003, Joshi and McCulloc,
2000).
I consider a signalling game between a school and a company. The school
prepares students for a ￿nal exam and may in￿ ate the grade of some low-
1In the United States, the evidence of the raise in grade in￿ ation has been documented
by Rojstaczer and Healy (2011). They collected historical data on letter grades awarded
by more than 200 four-year colleges and universities. Their results con￿rm the drastic
raisein the share of A grades awarded over the years. In Canada, the 52.6 % of high school
graduates applying to Ontario universities in 1995 had an A average, then this had risen
61% in 2004. In 1995, 9.4 percent of high school graduates reported an A+ average, risen
to a high of 14.9% in the 2003; the average grade of university applicants was 80% in
1997, and this percentage has steadily increased each year since (Allahar, A. and C￿tØ,
2007). In the United Kingdom, graduates who graduate with First-Class Honours rose
from 7.7% of total graduates in year 1996/97 to 14% in year 2008/09. For graduates with
a upper-second honour, it rose from 41.1% of total graduates in year 1996/97 to 48% in
year 2008/09 (Higher Education Statistic Agency). In Italy, the analysis ￿Stella￿ over
graduates for years 2004 and 2005 reports one third of graduates achieved the highest
grade (Modica, 2008).
2ability students. I examine two alternative school types: an ￿employment-
maximising￿school, willing the highest number of students to obtain a job,
and an ￿equalitarian￿school, which values equity in the employment across
advantaged and disadvantaged students. On the other side, the company
wants to hire only high-ability students and observes the exam grade as a
signal of ability.
In the one-shot version of the game, I assume that the company is aware
of the distribution of ability in the students￿population and the school strat-
egy. In this case, the results suggest that a school can in￿ ate grades to
smooth down class di⁄erences in the job market. This may happen when
more advantaged than disadvantaged students receive grade in￿ ation. The
result hinges upon the fact that more grade in￿ ation to advantaged students
may o⁄set the higher probability of advantaged students of having high abil-
ity. The result is stronger the higher the school concern for disadvantaged
students.
In the in￿nitely repeated version of the game, the company has no infor-
mation on students￿distribution of ability and school strategy at the begin-
ning of each period, but acquires it at the end of it. The school can play the
one-shot strategy or deviate from it by full in￿ ating grades, since this max-
imises the single-period employment in the game with imperfect information.
The company realises the behaviour of the school at the end of each period,
and can punish possible deviations by hiring through string-pulling, such as
appointing relatives, friends￿relatives, references and so on.
The introduction of many periods and imperfect information makes weaker
the bene￿cial e⁄ect of grade in￿ ation compared to the one-shot case. Given
the poor information of the company, the school has an incentive to deviate
from the equilibria where grade in￿ ation has a positive e⁄ect on disadvan-
taged students, as long as it is not so concerned on its reputation. Moreover,
resorting to hire through string-pulling as a further negative e⁄ect on class
di⁄erences, since an individual with advantaged background more likely has
3helpful ￿acquaintances￿to obtain a job, a better networking and so forth.
This result explains the facts occurring in some countries, such as Italy, where
grade in￿ ation is extremely high, every degree has the same legal value ir-
respective of the appointing school or university, so that there is no such
concern on the institution reputation, and hence the best way of obtaining a
job is through string-pulling.2
The economic literature only recently took interest on grade in￿ ation,
with few but noteworthy contributions. Yang and Yip (2003) present a model
where universities have an incentive to in￿ ate grades and they mutually rein-
force each other￿ s practice, determining a free-rider e⁄ect in grade in￿ ation.
In their equilibrium, universities with higher reputation in￿ ate more. Bern-
hardt and Popov (2010) develop a similar model where they identify the
increase over time in the quantity of good jobs as a driving force of grade
in￿ ation. They also extend their analysis by considering students with di⁄er-
ent social skills. Chan et al. (2007) develop a signalling model where ￿rms
observe the students￿grade but ignore their ability and the proportion of
talented ones in the population of students. This gives rise to an incentive
to help some low ability students by giving them good grades. Indeed the
labour market cannot fully distinguish whether this is due to a high grading
standard or whether the school has a large proportion of talented students,
and this in turn weakens the signal of good ones. Compared to these contri-
butions, I cast aside the competition between universities, and I focus on the
di⁄erences in students￿social background and to the e⁄ects on string-pulling.
An analysis of grade in￿ ation and the impact on the job market with
student with di⁄erent social background has been carried on by Schwager
(2008) in a matching model. In this paper, students are matched with ￿rms
which o⁄er di⁄erent kinds of job, according to the grade and the expected
ability. Regardless of social background, it is possible that mediocre students
2See Modica (2008) for some empirical evidence of grade in￿ ation in Italy. For the legal
value of an Italian degree, see the ￿D.M. 509/99, art. 4 comma 3 ￿ . For some evidence of
string-pulling in Italy, see Floris (2007).
4receive a high grade caused by grade in￿ ation. Also, the high-ability students
from advantaged backgrounds may bene￿t from grade in￿ ation since this
shields them from the competition on the part of able and disadvantaged
students. Compared to this analysis, I share the same assumptions on the
distributions of ability with di⁄ering social backgrounds, but in my model
disadvantaged students may bene￿t from the presence of in￿ ation grade.
In a setup which is similar to the present one, Tampieri (2011) examines
how students￿social background a⁄ects the teaching e⁄ort and the students￿
opportunities in the job market. Like in the one-shot version of this model,
the interaction between one school and one employer takes place, and stu-
dents are no players. Nonetheless, the focus of the model is on the changes
in the teaching e⁄ort according to the students￿social background and how
this in￿ uences the company behaviour, so that teaching e⁄ort is endogenously
determined in equilibrium.
The remainder of the paper is organised as follows. The model is pre-
sented in Section 2. Section 3 examines the one-shot game with perfect infor-
mation. Section 4 considers the repeated game with imperfect information.
Section 5 concludes.
2 The model
I study an economy with a number of students, with mass normalised to
one. Students attend all the same school and afterwards apply for a job in
the same company. Students can have high (H) or low (L) ability and an
advantaged (a) or disadvantaged (d) social background. Social background is
public information, and can be seen as a one-dimensional measure of family
environment, income, neighbourhood, ethnic origins and so forth. I denote
as ￿ 2 [0;1] the proportion of advantaged students, and pa;pd 2 [0;1] as the
probability that an advantaged or disadvantaged student has high-ability,
respectively, where pa > pd.
5For simplicity I abstract from the students￿e⁄ort and from schools or
companies competition, and I focus on the interplay between one school and
one company.
2.1 School
The school prepares students for a ￿nal exam, with equal teaching e⁄ort
irrespective of the student type, and learns the students￿ability through
their tests and assessments results.3 The possible exam outcomes are a high
(A) or a low (B) grade. I assume that the student￿ s probability of obtaining
an A grade is 1 if she has high ability, while it is zero if the student has low
ability.
Nonetheless, the school can in￿ uence job opportunities by in￿ ating the
grades of some low-ability students. In particular, a low-ability student re-
ceiving grade in￿ ation has a probability g 2 (0;1) of obtaining a high grade.
This assumption can be interpreted as follows. The school is in reality com-
posed by an institution manager and group of lecturers teaching di⁄erent
subjects. The ￿nal grades A and B just summarise the overall results in each
subject. The probability g exogenously represents the proportion of teachers
providing grade in￿ ation. The school orientation about grade in￿ ation, i.e.,
whether to allow some lecturers to do it or not depends on the institution
manager, who in fact represents the school decision along the model, while
the lecturers￿choice is taken as given.4
The school bene￿t depends on the speci￿c objective that it pursue. In
what follows, I will consider two cases, that is a school whose objective is (i)
to maximise total employment (employment-maximising school) and (ii) to
soothe class di⁄erences by favouring disadvantaged students￿ (equalitarian
3The label ￿school￿could be replaced by the label ￿university￿without altering the
ongoing analysis.
4An alternative interpretation is the case of European schooling systems, which feature
national testings at the end of school/university and thus limiting the in￿ ation grade power
of an educational institution.
6school).
2.2 Company
The company decides whether or not to hire a student and o⁄ers a single
job type. I de￿ne job capacity as the maximum number of students that
may be hired and I denoted it as ￿ 2 [0;1]. For simplicity, I assume that
￿ is exogenously related to the company￿ s production potential, i.e., its size
and technology, and it is completely independent by the company￿ s hiring
decision. Hence, neither the interaction between school and the company nor
the students￿type may in￿ uence ￿.
Also, I rule out uncertainty in the company market and I assume that the
students￿ability determines the company￿ s pro￿t entirely. In particular, each
high and low-ability student yields a pro￿t of ￿ > 0 and ￿1, respectively.
The choice of ￿ and ￿1 is to simplify the algebra: other normalisations
would complicate the analysis without changing any result. Assuming that
a low-ability student gives negative pro￿ts can be interpreted in many ways:
low-ability employees may have a marginal productivity which is lower than
salary cost. In addition, the company may want to lay o⁄ a low-ability
employee but this action still comes at a cost, e.g. industrial disputes, wasted
training costs and time, and so on. Thus the company￿ s payo⁄ is given by
￿
C = ￿!(H) ￿ !(L);
where !(H) and !(L) are the number of hired students with high or low
ability, respectively.
The company observes the grade that a student obtains in a ￿nal exam
as a signal of ability. The fact that the company can observe the social
background of a student seems plausible: in the real world, a personnel
manager can easily tell the job candidate social background through some
information such as ethnic origins, name, address, language style, manners,
7clothing, and so on.
2.3 One-shot game
The interaction in the one-shot game can be described as follows. Nature
draws the student types. Then, each student attends school and the school
chooses whether to in￿ ate the grades of some low-ability students in the
￿nal exam. Finally, each student applies for a job, and the company decides
whether to hire her.
The equilibrium concept is the perfect Bayesian equilibrium, which is a
combination of school and company strategies and beliefs where both agents
maximise their payo⁄. After observing a grade, the company has a belief,
consistent with Bayes￿rule, about the student type, conditional on all the
information he has: the student￿ s grade, the distribution of ability according
to the student￿ s social background and the school strategy. For each grade,
the company must maximise its expected pro￿t, given its belief and the school
strategy. In turn the school￿ s strategy must maximise its expected payo⁄,
given the company￿ s strategy. Finally, job capacity requires that the number
of hired students is at most ￿.
I begin by introducing the notations of the school and company￿ s actions:
￿ xa;xd; 2 [0;1] are the probabilities that the school in￿ ates the grade of
an advantaged and disadvantaged low-ability student, respectively;
￿ zAa;zBa;zAd;zBd 2 [0;1] are the probabilities that the company hires
an advantaged student with a high or low grade and a disadvantaged
student with a high or low grade, respectively.
I am now in a position to de￿ne the company beliefs on the students￿
ability. I denote them as ￿ (k j g;pi;xki), where k 2 fH;Lg represents the
ability level.
8De￿nition 1 The company￿ s beliefs on the students￿ability which are con-
sistent with the Bayes￿rule are
￿ (H j g;pi;xi) =
pi
pi + gxi (1 ￿ pi)
;
and
￿ (L j g;pi;xi) =
gxi (1 ￿ pi)
pi + gxi (1 ￿ pi)
:
Then I make the following assumption.
Assumption 1 ￿ < ￿(pa + g (1 ￿ pa)) + (1 ￿ ￿)(pd + g (1 ￿ pd))):
Assumption 1 requires job capacity to be lower than the highest pos-
sible number of high-grade students. This is necessary in order to focus
the attention on those equilibria where social background can be used as
an informative tool in the company￿ s decisions. When Assumption 1 does
not hold, the company may hire all the high-grade students irrespective of
their social background, hence this would not a⁄ect their job opportunities.
Nonetheless, there is a large empirical evidence showing that the students￿




In this section I examine the static game with employment-maximising school.
In this case, the school obtains a bene￿t b > 0 for every hired student, so
5For some empirical evidence, Glyn and Salverda (2000) and Berthoud and Blekesaune
(2006) show that a disadvantaged social background negatively a⁄ects the chance of ￿nding
a job in OECD countries and the UK, respectively.
9that its payo⁄ is given by
￿
S = b(!(H) + !(L)):
The equilibria are summarised in the following proposition.
Proposition 1 Let Assumption 1 hold and the school be employment-maximising.
Case 1. Large proportion of high-ability students in both popu-
lations. If




then the school and company strategy is: xa = xd = 1 and
zAa = 1;zAd =
￿ ￿ ￿ (pa + g (1 ￿ pa))
(1 ￿ ￿)(pd + g (1 ￿ pd))
;zBa = zBd = 0;
respectively.






then the school and company strategy is:





zAa = 1;zAd =
￿ ￿ ￿ (pa + g (1 ￿ pa))
(1 ￿ ￿)(pd + xdg (1 ￿ pd))
;zBa = zBd = 0;
respectively.




￿ pa ￿ pd;
10then the school and company strategy is:





zAa = zAd =
￿
[￿(pa + xag (1 ￿ pa)) + (1 ￿ ￿)(pd + xdg (1 ￿ pd))]
;zBa = zBd = 0;
respectively.
Proof. See Appendix.
In Case 1, the school provides every student with grade in￿ ation, since
there is a large amount of high ability students in the population of both
social backgrounds. The company obtains a positive expected pro￿t by high-
grade students from both advantaged and disadvantaged backgrounds. Thus,
his optimal strategy is to hire all of them, but Assumption 1 prevents this
possibility, and force the company to choose between these two types. He
will hire all the advantaged students, since they give a higher expected pro￿t,
and the disadvantaged students will be hired only for the remainder of job
capacity.
In Case 2, the company prefers not to hire all the disadvantaged and
high-grade students, while with low grade in￿ ation it is indi⁄erent between
hiring a student with advantaged or disadvantaged background. In Case 2
and 3, the school provides grade in￿ ation to a lower number of disadvantaged
and low-ability students, so as to increase the chance that a disadvantaged
and high-grade student has high ability. It is worth noting that the company
never hires a low-grade student, since a low-grade student has low ability
with probability one.










































Case 2 Case 1
Figure 1 illustrates Proposition 1 for a given value of g, where pa > pd
holds above the upward-sloping 45 degrees line. This is the key assumption
and makes the company obtain a higher expected payo⁄by hiring advantaged
students, given the same grade in￿ ation. However this may not happen if the
school in￿ ates grades more for advantaged students. Indeed this would raise
the expected quality of the disadvantaged and high-grade students. In Case
1, the amount of students obtaining a job is maximised when the school gives
grade in￿ ation to all of them, since the company thinks that a high grade
student very likely has high ability, irrespective of her social background.
12In Case 2 and 3, the school maximises the amount of hired disadvantaged
students by providing more grade in￿ ation to advantaged students. More
speci￿cally, with middle grade in￿ ation the company still prefers advantaged
rather than disadvantaged and high-grade students. In Case 3, disadvantaged
students have the same job opportunities of the advantaged ones. The reason
of this result is the following. Since the school in￿ ates less the grades of
disadvantaged rather than advantaged students, the grade in￿ ation e⁄ect
is stronger for the latter. This result di⁄ers from other results on grade
in￿ ation (Schwager, 2008), where the job opportunities of high-ability and
disadvantaged students are penalised by the grade in￿ ation of low-ability and
advantaged students.
Proposition 1 shows that, in the presence of an employment-maximising
school, grade in￿ ation has ambiguous e⁄ects on the job opportunities of
disadvantaged students according to which equilibrium holds. This depends
on the population distribution of ability and the size of grade in￿ ation g, i.e.,
on how many low-ability students receive a high grade with grade in￿ ation.
This is summarised in the following corollary.
Corollary 1 An increase in the size of grade in￿ation diminishes the em-
ployment opportunities and the provision of grade in￿ation.
Proof. For all xd;xa 2 [0;1]; di⁄erentiation of
￿ ￿ ￿(pa + g (1 ￿ pa))
(1 ￿ ￿)(pd + xdg (1 ￿ pd))
and
￿
￿(pa + xag (1 ￿ pa)) + (1 ￿ ￿)(pd + xdg (1 ￿ pd))
with respect to g yields
@
@g
￿ ￿ ￿(pa + g (1 ￿ pa))





pd + xdg (1 ￿ pd)
￿
(1 ￿ pd)(￿ ￿ ￿ (pa + g (1 ￿ pa)))






￿(pa + xag (1 ￿ pa)) + (1 ￿ ￿)(pd + xdg (1 ￿ pd))
=
￿(xd (1 ￿ ￿)(pd ￿ 1) ￿ ￿xa (1 ￿ pa))
















g2 (1 ￿ pd)
< 0:
An raise in the size of grade in￿ ation makes the number of high-grade
students increase. Thus their probability of being hired decreases and in
turn probability of obtaining grade in￿ ation decreases.
3.2 Equalitarian school
In this paragraph I consider the case where the school speci￿cally aims to
improve the conditions of disadvantaged students. This can be the situa-
tion where the school is managed by a social planner with the aim to soothe
di⁄erences in the job market outcomes by students di⁄ering in social back-
ground. I assume that the school gives a higher weight to the hiring of a
disadvantaged student, hence its payo⁄ is given by
￿
S = ba￿(!(H) + !(L)) + bd (1 ￿ ￿)(!(H) + !(L));
where bd > ba.
The result can be summarised in the following proposition.
14Proposition 2 Let Assumption 1 hold and the school be equalitarian.






then the school and company strategy are:
xa = 1; xd =
pd (1 ￿ pa)




￿ ￿ (1 ￿ ￿)(pd + xdg (1 ￿ pd))
￿(pa + g (1 ￿ pa))
;zAd = 1;zBa = zBd = 0;
respectively.




￿ pa ￿ pd;










￿ ￿ (1 ￿ ￿)(pd + xdg (1 ￿ pd))
￿(pa + xag (1 ￿ pa))
;zAd = 1;zBa = zBd = 0;
respectively.
Proof. See Appendix.
Proposition 2 shows that a school caring of the job opportunities of the
disadvantaged students can use grade in￿ ation as a tool to achieve this goal.
154 Repeated game and string-pulling
In this section I consider a setting where the game is in￿nitely repeated and
the company does not know the school strategy at the beginning of each
period, but only learns it through the true abilities of the students once they
have been hired, which can be inferred by pro￿ts. Also, I assume that the
company ignores the ability and social background distributions pi and ￿ be-
fore seeing its own pro￿t but obtains it afterwards. Finally, I assume that the
ability distribution and the number of advantaged or disadvantaged students
change over time, so as the company cannot infer it based on the previous
generations. In what follows, I will consider the case with the employment-
maximising school only. The reason is that, with equalitarian school, the
company has a unique strategy along the entire parameter space (g;pa;pd),
so that the school has no incentives to deviate from the one-shot game strat-
egy.
At the ￿rst period, the company decides its hiring policy according to
an exogenous belief on the school strategy. The school chooses it among the
ones presented in Proposition 1. The school may start with a strategy that
is ￿correct￿according to the parameter values (g;pa;pd) and thus replicating
the correspondent one-shot equilibrium. After checking its own pro￿t and
thus obtaining perfect information, the company will know that the school
played the one-shot strategy and will trust it in the next period.
However, the one-shot equilibrium strategy not necessarily is the one
that gives the school highest expected payo⁄, and the school may deviate by
increasing it but losing the trust of the company. In particular, the school has
3 possible strategies to choose according to Proposition 1. Between them,
it always prefers to fully in￿ ate, in order to obtain the maximum payo⁄.
The reason is simple. Given the assumptions on the company information
and any possible company belief, the employment (and in turn the school
payo⁄) is maximised in the single period through a full in￿ ating strategy. As
a consequence, if the parameter values (g;pa;pd) are such that the one-shot
16equilibrium is Case 1, then the school never deviates from that case, and may
have an incentive to do it if the one-shot equilibrium is with Case 2 or 3.
If the school deviates (Case 2 and 3), then in the following period the
company hires from out of the school through string-pulling (from now on,
SP), that is informal channels, accepting friends pressure for hiring some
relatives, and so forth. Let us assume that the company payo⁄ obtained
by using SP is lower than the one obtained by the one-shot equilibrium but
higher than the case where the school deviates to full in￿ ation:
￿
C (one-shot eq.) > ￿
C (SP) > ￿
C (dev.):
This assumption is reasonable as SP cannot be an objective and systematic
selection tool. Also, I assume that the company can cover its hiring necessities
through SP for a proportion q 2 (0;1] only:
When the company hires through SP, then the school obtains zero ben-
e￿ts. For simplicity I assume that the company will adopt a grim-trigger
strategy ￿ la Friedman (1971) in the sense that, if the school plays the one-
shot strategy, the company will trust it in the following period, otherwise the
company will hire from SP forever for a proportion q and from the school for
the other part, and the school will play equilibrium 1 forever. In this contest,
the discount factor ￿ can be interpreted as a measure of the importance that
the school gives to its reputation. The more the school cares of it, the higher










that is met by all
￿ ￿ ￿
￿ =
￿S (dev) ￿ ￿S (one-shot eq.)
q￿S (dev)
:
17It is straightforward to notice that the threshold level ￿
￿ ensuring that
the school plays the one-shot strategy decreases the higher the chance for
the company to hire from SP, since the company￿ s outside option is stronger.
The ongoing discussion can be summarised in:
Proposition 3 Let Assumptions 1 and 2 hold and the company plays a grim-
trigger strategy in the in￿nitely repeated game:
(i) for pa ￿ pd ￿ g=(￿ + g) then the equilibrium in the repeated game
with imperfect information has the same solution of the one-shot game;
(ii) for all g=(￿ + g) ￿ pd; then the equilibrium in the repeated game with
imperfect information has the same solution of the one-shot game for:
￿ ￿ ￿
￿ =
￿S (cheats) ￿ ￿S (school correct)
q￿S (cheats)
;
otherwise the school deviates and the company hires through SP for a pro-
portion q for all the periods onward.
Proposition 3 shows that the school has an incentive to fully in￿ ate over
time. This result may explain the situation in those countries where grade
in￿ ation is strong and companies largely hire through SP, such as Italy. Note
that the deviation equilibrium is more likely to occur in the case where
the school has no concern on her reputation.6 In an educational system
where the degree obtained in each institution has the same legal value, a
school/university has no strong concerns about its reputation.7
Moreover, by having in mind the di⁄erences in social background, grade
in￿ ation loses its bene￿cial features on soothing job opportunities. Since a
6An alternative scenario is the case with many schools/universities, where grade in-
￿ ation can emerge as a free-rider problem (see Yang and Yip, 2003), since every school
has incentive in in￿ ating (every school is doing it!), so that the relative importance at-
tributed to each school does not change but the absolute importance of the school system
(￿) becomes low.
7By imagining a setting with competition between schools then ￿ becomes a ￿collective￿
measure of reputation (see Tirole, 1996).
18student with an advantaged background has more linking and connections
compared to an individual with disadvantaged background, it is more likely
that a student hired with SP has advantaged background (see Caliendo et
al., 2009, for some recent evidence on that).
5 Concluding remarks
In this paper I analysed whether grade in￿ ation may in fact have some pos-
itive e⁄ect in soothing class di⁄erences, and at the same time if can explain
the emerging of job string pulling. In the one-shot version of the game, the
school can in￿ ate grades to smooth down class di⁄erences in the job mar-
ket by in￿ ating the grades of more advantaged rather than disadvantaged
students.
In the in￿nitely repeated version of the game the bene￿cial e⁄ect of grade
in￿ ation is weaker with respect to the one-shot case. Given the poor infor-
mation of the company, the school has an incentive to deviate from the equi-
libria where grade in￿ ation has a positive e⁄ect on disadvantaged students,
as long as it is not so concerned on its reputation. Moreover, resorting to
hire through string-pulling as a further negative e⁄ect on class di⁄erences,
since an individual with advantaged background more likely has helpful ￿ac-
quaintances￿to obtain a job, a better networking and so forth. This result
explains the facts occurring in some countries where there is strong grade
in￿ ation, school and universities have no such concern on their reputation
and thus the best way of obtaining a job is through string-pulling. Further
analysis should examine the e⁄ects on welfare on string-pulling, the resulting
ine¢ ciencies and some policy consideration in order to exacerbate it.
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Appendix
Proof of Proposition 1
Along the proof, we leave aside the analysis about low-grade students. Indeed
these students are never hired since they have low ability with probability 1.
Case 1
Company. The company strategy is
zAa = 1;zBa = 0;zAd =
￿ ￿ ￿(pa + g (1 ￿ pa))
(1 ￿ ￿)(pd + g (1 ￿ pd))
;zBd = 0:
The company￿ s beliefs for advantaged students are
￿ (H j A;a) =
pa
pa + g (1 ￿ pa)
and
￿ (L j A;a) =
g (1 ￿ pa)
pa + g (1 ￿ pa)
;
22if the student has a high grade. Thus the expected pro￿t for hiring an




pa + g (1 ￿ pa)
￿ ￿
g (1 ￿ pa)




pa + g (1 ￿ pa)
￿ ￿
￿ (1 ￿ pa)
pa + g (1 ￿ pa)
￿ 0;
and, after few passages, pa ￿ g=(￿ + g).
The company￿ s beliefs for disadvantaged students are
￿ (H j A;d) =
pd
pd + g (1 ￿ pd)
and
￿ (L j A;d) =
g (1 ￿ pd)
pd + g (1 ￿ pd)
;




pd + g (1 ￿ pd)
￿ ￿
g (1 ￿ pd)




pd + g (1 ￿ pd)
￿ ￿
g (1 ￿ pd)
pd + g (1 ￿ pd)
￿ 0;





Then the company needs to compare the expected pro￿t obtained by high
grade students with di⁄erent social background: this is ￿C (E;A;a) > ￿C (E;A;d),
as pa > pd. As a consequence,the company admits all the advantaged and
8The ￿rst letter in parenthesis of the company expected pro￿t indicates the action
performed by the employer, where E indicates ￿to hire￿and N ￿to not￿ . the second letter
speci￿es the student￿ s grade, where A and B stands for high and low grade, respectively.
Finally, a and d indicates the student￿ s social background.
23high-grade students and the disadvantaged ones only for the remainder of
job capacity.




which is the maximum payo⁄ that the school can acquire, so that this is the
dominant strategy.
Finally, the job capacity constraint requires:
￿(pa + g (1 ￿ pa)) + zAd (1 ￿ ￿)(pd + g (1 ￿ pd)) ￿ ￿;
so that
zAd =
￿ ￿ ￿(pa + g (1 ￿ pa))







the company and school strategy for advantaged students does not change
compared to the previous case. So the proof will focus on the strategies for
disadvantaged students.
Company. The company strategy is
zAa = 1;zBa = 0;zAd =
￿ ￿ ￿(pa + g (1 ￿ pa))







9The ￿rst letters in the parenthesis of the school expected payo⁄ indicates the action
performed by the school, where G and NG stands for ￿to give￿and ￿not to give grade
in￿ ation￿ . The second letter speci￿es the student￿ s social background.
24if the school in￿ ates the grades of all disadvantaged and low-ability students
(xd = 1), then the company would not hire any of them. Hence the school
needs to provide less in￿ ation grade. The company￿ s beliefs for disadvantaged
students are
￿ (H j A;d) =
pd
pd + gxd (1 ￿ pd)
and
￿ (L j A;d) =
gxd (1 ￿ pd)
pd + gxd (1 ￿ pd)
;





pd + gxd (1 ￿ pd)
￿ ￿
gxd (1 ￿ pd)
pd + gxd (1 ￿ pd)
:
The company would hire all the disadvantaged students only if this is higher









by which pd < g=(￿ + g). This con￿rms the parameters space where this
equilibrium lies. Like in the previous equilibrium, the company needs to
compare the expected pro￿t obtained by high grade students with di⁄er-
ent social background, obtaining the same result as before in favour of the
advantaged students: ￿C (E;A;a) > ￿C (E;A;d).
School. The school expected payo⁄ is:
￿
S = b[￿(pa + g (1 ￿ pa)) + zAd (1 ￿ ￿)(pd + xdg (1 ￿ pd))]:
By decreasing xd, the ￿S decreases, while by increasing it to more than
25pa￿
(1￿pa)g, then the company would not hire disadvantaged students, given the
distribution of ability in the disadvantaged population. Thus this is the
school best reply.
Finally, the job capacity constraint requires:
￿(pa + g (1 ￿ pa)) + zAd (1 ￿ ￿)(pd + xdg (1 ￿ pd)) ￿ ￿;
so that
zAd =
￿ ￿ ￿(pa + g (1 ￿ pa))







the company and school strategy for disadvantaged students does not change
compared to the previous case. So the proof will focus on the strategies for
advantaged students.
Company. The company strategy is
zAa = 1;zBa = 0;zAd =
￿ ￿ ￿(pa + g (1 ￿ pa))







if the school in￿ ates the grades of all advantaged and low-ability students
(xa = 1), then the company would not hire any of them. Hence the school
needs to provide less in￿ ation grade. The company￿ s beliefs for advantaged
students are
￿ (H j A;a) =
pa
pa + gxa (1 ￿ pa)
26and
￿ (L j A;a) =
gxa (1 ￿ pa)
pa + gxa (1 ￿ pa)
;
if the student has a high grade. Thus the expected pro￿t for hiring a disad-




pa + gxa (1 ￿ pa)
￿ ￿
gxa (1 ￿ pa)
pa + gxa (1 ￿ pa)
:
The company would hire all the disadvantaged students only if this is higher









by which pa < g=(￿ + g). This con￿rms the parameters space where this
equilibrium lies. Like in the previous equilibrium, the company needs to
compare the expected pro￿t obtained by high grade students with di⁄er-
ent social background, obtaining the same result as before in favour of the
advantaged students: ￿C (E;A;a) > ￿C (E;A;d).
School. The school expected payo⁄ is:
￿
S = b[zAa￿(pa + xag (1 ￿ pa)) + zAd (1 ￿ ￿)(pd + xdg (1 ￿ pd))];





(1￿pa)g, respectively, would lead the company not
to hire anyone, since in both populations of students the proportion of low
ability students is too high.
Finally, the job capacity constraint requires:
zAa￿(pa + xag (1 ￿ pa)) + zAd (1 ￿ ￿)(pd + xdg (1 ￿ pd)) ￿ ￿;
27since the company strategy is zAa = zAd,
zAa = zAd =
￿
[￿(pa + xag (1 ￿ pa)) + (1 ￿ ￿)(pd + xdg (1 ￿ pd))]
Proof of Proposition 2
Case 1
Company. The company strategy is
zAa =
￿ ￿ (1 ￿ ￿)(pd + g (1 ￿ pd))
￿(pa + g (1 ￿ pa))
;zBa = 0;zAd = 1;zBd = 0:
The company￿ s beliefs for advantaged students are
￿ (H j A;a) =
pa
pa + g (1 ￿ pa)
and
￿ (L j A;a) =
g (1 ￿ pa)
pa + g (1 ￿ pa)
;
if the student has a high grade. Thus the expected pro￿t for hiring an




pa + g (1 ￿ pa)
￿ ￿
g (1 ￿ pa)




pa + g (1 ￿ pa)
￿ ￿
￿ (1 ￿ pa)
pa + g (1 ￿ pa)
￿ 0;
and, after few passages, pa ￿ g=(￿ + g).
The company￿ s beliefs for disadvantaged students are
￿ (H j A;d) =
pd
pd + xdg (1 ￿ pd)
28and
￿ (L j A;d) =
xdg (1 ￿ pd)
pd + xdg (1 ￿ pd)
;




pd + xdg (1 ￿ pd)
￿ ￿
xdg (1 ￿ pd)




pd + xdg (1 ￿ pd)
￿ ￿
xdg (1 ￿ pd)
pd + xdg (1 ￿ pd)
￿ 0;





Then the company needs to compare the expected pro￿t obtained by high
grade students with di⁄erent social background. This needs to be ￿C (E;A;d) >
￿C (E;A;a) :
pd￿ ￿ xdg (1 ￿ pd)
pd + xdg (1 ￿ pd)
￿
pa￿ ￿ g (1 ￿ pa)
pa + g (1 ￿ pa)
(pd￿ ￿ xdg (1 ￿ pd))(pa + g (1 ￿ pa)) ￿ (pa￿ ￿ g (1 ￿ pa))(pd + xdg (1 ￿ pd))
so that the school strategy is:
xa = 1;xd =
pd (1 ￿ pa)
pa (1 ￿ pd)
:
In order to be a probability, it is necessary that
pd (1 ￿ pa)








, which respects the assumption pa > pd: In other
words, the school in￿ ates less the disadvantaged students according to the
distribution of ability in both populations.





29School. The school expected payo⁄ is:
￿
S = ba￿ (pa + g (1 ￿ pa)) + bd (1 ￿ ￿)(pd + xdg (1 ￿ pd));
which is the maximum payo⁄ that the school can acquire, so that this is the
dominant strategy.
Finally, the job capacity constraint requires:
zAa￿(pa + g (1 ￿ pa)) + (1 ￿ ￿)(pd + xdg (1 ￿ pd)) ￿ ￿;
so that
zAa =
￿ ￿ (1 ￿ ￿)(pd + xdg (1 ￿ pd))
￿(pa + g (1 ￿ pa))
:





the school needs to provide less in￿ ation grade to disadvantaged students
than the previous case, otherwise the company would not hire any of them.




pd + gxd (1 ￿ pd)
￿ ￿
gxd (1 ￿ pd)
pd + gxd (1 ￿ pd)
:
The company would hire all the disadvantaged students only if this is higher





Like in the previous equilibrium, the company needs to compare the expected
pro￿t obtained by high grade students with di⁄erent social background.
Then the company needs to compare the expected pro￿t obtained by
high grade students with di⁄erent social background: this is ￿C (E;A;d) >
30￿C (E;A;a) :
pd￿ ￿ xdg (1 ￿ pd)
pd + xdg (1 ￿ pd)
￿
pa￿ ￿ g (1 ￿ pa)
pa + g (1 ￿ pa)
(pd￿ ￿ xdg (1 ￿ pd))(pa + g (1 ￿ pa)) ￿ (pa￿ ￿ g (1 ￿ pa))(pd + xdg (1 ￿ pd))
so that the school strategy for disadvantaged students is:
xd =
pd (1 ￿ pa)
pa (1 ￿ pd)
:
Thus it is necessary that:
pd (1 ￿ pa)










School. The school expected payo⁄ is:
￿
S = bd (1 ￿ ￿)(pd + xdg (1 ￿ pd)) + ba￿ (pa + g (1 ￿ pa)):
By decreasing xd, the ￿S decreases, while by increasing it to more than
pa￿
(1 ￿ pa)g
, then the company would not hire disadvantaged students, given
the distribution of ability in the disadvantaged population. Thus this is the
school best reply.
Finally, the job capacity constraint requires:
zAa￿(pa + g (1 ￿ pa)) + b[(1 ￿ ￿)(pd + xdg (1 ￿ pd))] ￿ ￿;
so that
zAa =
￿ ￿ b(1 ￿ ￿)(pd + xdg (1 ￿ pd))
￿(pa + g (1 ￿ pa))
31Case 2
Company. The company strategy is
zAa = 1;zBa = 0;zAd =
￿ ￿ ￿(pa + g (1 ￿ pa))







if the school in￿ ates the grades of all advantaged and low-ability students
(xa = 1), then the company would not hire any of them. Hence the school
needs to provide less in￿ ation grade. The expected pro￿t for hiring an ad-




pa + gxa (1 ￿ pa)
￿ ￿
gxa (1 ￿ pa)






pd + gxd (1 ￿ pd)
￿ ￿
gxd (1 ￿ pd)
pd + gxd (1 ￿ pd)
;
respectively. The two conditions are ￿C (E;A;a) ￿ 0 and ￿C (E;A;d) ￿




pa￿ ￿ xag (1 ￿ pa)
pa + xag (1 ￿ pa)
￿ 0
pd￿ ￿ xdg (1 ￿ pd)
pd + xdg (1 ￿ pd)
￿
pa￿ ￿ xag (1 ￿ pa)
pa + xag (1 ￿ pa)








School. The school expected payo⁄ is:
￿
S = bazAa￿(pa + xag (1 ￿ pa)) + bdzAd (1 ￿ ￿)(pd + xdg (1 ￿ pd));





(1￿pd)g, respectively, would lead the company not
to hire anyone, since in both populations of students the proportion of low
ability students is too high.
Finally, the job capacity constraint requires:
zAa￿(pa + xag (1 ￿ pa)) + (1 ￿ ￿)(pd + xdg (1 ￿ pd)) ￿ ￿;
so that
zAa =
￿ ￿ (1 ￿ ￿)(pd + xdg (1 ￿ pd))
￿(pa + xag (1 ￿ pa))
: ￿
33 